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ABSTRACT 
     System-generated or user-generated text-based passwords are commonly used by the 
users to authenticate access to their electronic assets. These passwords may vary in usability 
and memorability depending on the type of password generation, composition and length. 
However, little past research has compared usability and memorability of passwords, 
satisfying minimum entropy for a secure password. This study compared three password 
policy conditions, assigning/generating passwords of approximately equal minimum security, 
i.e. 6-character alphanumeric system-generated passwords, minimum 8-character restricted 
user-generated passwords and minimum 16-character unrestricted user-generated passwords.  
     The study involved 54 participants, equally divided into three groups, 18 in each password 
policy condition. The study took place over two sessions, with a period of 5-7 days in 
between them. In the first session, depending on the password policy condition, the 
participants were either assigned or asked to create a password. The participants were then 
asked to recall their passwords in the same session and after 5-7 days in the second session. 
The three password policy conditions were compared with respect to the dependent 
variables-- the time taken to create the password account, the password creation error rates, 
the time taken to recall and recall error rates for both sessions, the number of unrecoverable 
passwords in the second session, the proximity of the recalled password to the stored 
password measured by Damerau-Levenshtein and Jaro-Winkler edit distances, and the 
subjective ratings for the NASA task load indices and the System Usability Scale 
questionnaire.  
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     There was significant difference between the password policy condition for the time taken 
to create a password account, password creation error rates, time taken to recall the 
passwords and temporal demand index of the NASA-TLX questionnaire. Across the task 
sessions, there were statistically significant differences for time taken to recall system-
generated passwords, recall error rates, performance index of the NASA-TLX questionnaire 
and the SUS score. There was no significant difference for recall error rates and 
unrecoverable passwords among password policy conditions.  
     The results of this study suggest that the overall performance of the 8-character password 
was weaker compared to system-generated and 16-character passwords. The qualitative 
analysis of the comments made by the participants and the additional analysis of the user-
generated passwords suggests that the participants showed bias towards the commonly used 
8-character password policy condition. However, this bias did not translate into better 
memorability of the 8-character password. The performance and the positive trends exhibited 
by 16-character passwords indicate a potential area for the password application designers to 
explore. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
     Computer authentication systems in the 1970s and early 1980s were primarily used by 
defense facilities, organizations and universities to control access to their sensitive assets. 
These authentication systems employed a two-part procedure, user identification and user 
authentication.  The users identified themselves by logging in using the alphanumeric id 
they had created. While in the authentication procedure, they “shared a secret” in the 
form of a password with a computer to establish their credentials (Brostoff & Sasse, 
2000). This password was either assigned or created, and subsequently memorized by the 
users. This concept of user ids and passwords was found to be a cost-effective and 
efficient method of maintaining security (Conklin, Dietrich, & Walz, 2004). One of the 
key elements in these systems was the reliance on human cognitive ability to remember 
both, the most important being the password (Conklin et al., 2004). Since the users were 
expected to remember their passwords when prompted without writing them down, these 
authentication systems were also called knowledge-based.  
     The earliest passwords were generated by the system and assigned to the user 
employees to ensure overall security (Adams, Sasse, & Lunt, 1997) (Adams & Sasse, 
1999). However, as they were composed of apparently random characters having no 
meaning for the users, they were more difficult to remember than user-generated ones 
(Zviran & Haga, 1993). This high degree of complexity caused users to externalize them 
by writing them down, leading to potential breaches in security (Zviran & Haga, 1993). It 
led to user-generated passwords becoming widely used (Adams et al., 1997) even though 
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system-generated ones are more difficult to guess (Zviran & Haga, 1993). To enhance the 
security of user-generated passwords, they can be selected from a large domain of 
character sets, giving them the appearance of being randomly generated (Zviran & Haga, 
1993). However, password guidelines that encourage users to do this, though they may 
help to create passwords that are difficult to crack, become difficult to use (Conklin et al., 
2004). The limitations associated with restrictions on user-generated passwords include 
the time needed to generate an acceptable one, the guidelines that result in less 
memorable ones than those generated without them, and the additional restrictions that 
may cause more entry errors and lengthen the login procedure (Proctor, Mei-ching Lien, 
Vu, Schultz, & Salvendy, 2002). This issue concerning password generation is made 
more complex because users also tend to form their own mental models of good 
passwords regardless of the instructions provided, favoring memorability over security 
(Forget, Chiasson, & Biddle, 2007). As a result, users circumvent password guidelines 
when given a chance, meaning that their passwords are still subject to being breached by 
brute force attacks. In such attacks, the intruder creates and matches with the target 
password all possible combinations using a standard US keyboard of 94 characters 
(Allendoerfer, K., & Pai, S., 2005). In order to protect against such attacks, password 
guidelines recommend the use of all character sets and longer passwords (Allendoerfer et 
al., 2005).  
     With the advent of PCs in offices, school and homes, the user base has grown both in 
number and in its demographics (Conklin et al., 2004). In addition, the increased use of 
the internet has led to an increase in the number of password applications (Conklin et al., 
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2004). Users now have multiple web accounts ranging from banking to retail, each with a 
different password (Conklin et al., 2004), creating a significant usability problem 
(Brostoff et al., 2000). To address these memorability issues, alternate authentication 
systems, such as biometric systems and image-based passwords systems, were introduced 
in the 1990s. Biometrics utilizes physical attributes such as finger prints, the retina, or 
characteristic behavior such as the signature and voice of the user for authentication 
(Clarke & Furnell, 2005). However, these authentication systems are expensive, 
obtrusive, difficult to implement on a large scale and have low user acceptance (Proctor 
et al., 2002). Similarly, image-based passwords, relying on the heuristic of recognition 
being more memorable than recall, are not as prevalent due to such reasons as user 
resistance to change from text-based passwords and the cost of modifying existing 
systems (Jeyaraman & Topkara, 2005). Text-based passwords remain the most common 
form of authentication (Forget et al., 2007), with user-generated passwords being 
preferred because of their meaningfulness to the user and greater memorability. Recall of 
material usually is better if users generate it rather than merely having it provided for 
them (Proctor et al., 2002).  
     To improve security and usability of user-generated passwords, proactive user-
generated password checking, developed to ensure that user-generated passwords satisfy 
the composition guidelines, is frequently implemented (Proctor et al., 2002). These 
composition guidelines generally constrain user-generated passwords with respect to 
length, composition of character sets and inclusion in a dictionary (Herley, 2009). In 
early research, Zviran et al. (1993) compared the memorability of system-generated and 
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user-generated passwords. More recently, researchers have compared the usability of 
different user-generated password composition schemes. However, the passwords created 
using different composition schemes in these studies achieved different levels of 
minimum security, making comparisons across them difficult. To expand on this 
research, this study  compared passwords satisfying NIST Level 2 security requirements 
that were either assigned by the system or created by the user using two different 
composition schemes.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
     Random system-generated passwords were one of the first types to be implemented in 
organizations to protect electronic information. Organizations assigned system-generated 
passwords to the employees who either memorized or kept a record of them and logged-
in to access systems which were password protected. By assigning passwords to 
employees, organizations ensured that the combinations of characters were secure. 
     However, the responsibility for the security of electronic information has shifted from 
the organizations to the users. The users create their own passwords for applications on 
their personal computers, password systems or operating systems. These user-generated 
passwords are easier to remember than the random system-generated passwords that 
users were assigned. Towards the end of the 1990s and at the beginning of the new 
millennium, the increased usage of internet-based technologies saw a higher 
incorporation of user-generated password authentication systems for web sites, online 
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applications and offline services, meaning the number of passwords per user has 
increased. 
     To compare the usability and preferences of user-generated passwords and randomly 
assigned passwords, Zviran et al. (1993) had 103 participants create two user-generated 
passwords in addition to being assigned an eight-character random one as part of their 
study. One of the user-generated passwords was a maximum of 8 characters long and the 
other was an alphanumeric of up to 80 characters (passphrase). After three months, the 
participants’ recall success rate was the highest for the 8-character user-generated 
passwords, followed by assigned random passwords and then the 80-character passwords. 
These results were supported by the data obtained with a subjective questionnaire in 
which the participants ranked the 8-character user-generated passwords highest for appeal 
and ease-of-recall. These passwords were further analyzed to determine the 
characteristics affecting their recall. The results revealed that 92% were composed of 
only lower case letters, suggesting better memorability of passwords of this composition. 
     Extending the focus of this study, Adams et al. (1997) investigated the memorability 
and cognitive demands of user-generated passwords. Their analysis of the responses of 
139 participants revealed that fifty percent of them externalized their passwords and/or 
created similar passwords to cope with the cognitive demands associated with recalling 
multiple ones. These results were confirmed by the in-depth interviews of 30 of these 139 
participants. In addition, these interviews revealed that the use of common words and 
personal data compromised the security of the passwords. As an extension of this study, 
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Adams et al. (1999) proposed user-centered design of password systems and educating 
users on password guidelines to cope with the cognitive demands associated with 
multiple passwords. One of the objectives of this study was to investigate the 
effectiveness of the early generic composition guidelines recommended by the Federal 
Information Processing Standards (FIPS, 1985). Its criteria for the creation of user-
generated passwords of varying levels of security include length and the character sets 
used, with the recommendation of a length of at least 4 characters and a composition 
including numbers. However, cognitive demand and insufficient feedback on the strength 
of the multiple passwords caused users to focus on memorability rather than security. 
One of the recommendations of Adams et al. (1999) was to provide adequate online 
feedback on the strength of the password entered as well as password composition 
guidelines during creation to mitigate the need for having to change passwords at regular 
intervals. 
     In a quantitative study of the memorability and composition of user-generated 
passwords, Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, (2001) conducted a study in which 144 British 
Telecom employees were asked to describe the reason for the need to reset their 
passwords and to report the number of passwords they used at work. It was found that the 
employees had an average of 16 passwords. The passwords which were infrequently used 
were forgotten the most easily, followed by the moderately and then frequently used 
passwords. However, the 6-digit passwords for accessing voicemails yielded different 
results; irrespective of the frequency of use, their recall rate was low. Unlike passwords, 
they were forgotten even after short durations of non-use. These results indicated the 
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correlation between the composition of passwords and their memorability and recall, 
further supporting the conclusion that the compositions of passwords affect their 
memorability and recall irrespective of the frequency of their use.  
     To understand the effect of various composition schemes and additional 
guidelines/restrictions on password usability, Proctor et al. (2002) conducted an 
experiment involving 24 participants. For the first condition, called “minimal,” the 
participants created a password of at least 5 characters. The second, called “additional,” 
incorporated the additional guidelines of having at least one member from all the 
character sets on a keyboard, at most one character from the username and no 
consecutive similar characters. The participants were asked to rate each of the two 
passwords on difficulty of generation and recall using a 7-point Likert scale, with 7 being 
the most difficult. In the results, statistically significant difference was found between the 
time taken to generate and recall minimal condition passwords and additional condition 
passwords. Passwords with the additional composition restrictions were significantly 
harder to generate and remember than those based on the minimal requirements. All of 
the passwords created were subsequently subjected to a password cracking software. The 
results further revealed that 18 of 24 minimal condition passwords were cracked 
compared to eight of 24 in the additional condition, indicating the level of lower strength 
of passwords in the former.  
     Using a similar procedure, Proctor et al. (2002) conducted a second experiment which 
required a minimum length of at least 8 characters for the passwords. Similarly, the 
 
 
8 
 
results of the second experiment found a statistically significant difference between the 
time taken to generate and recall minimal condition passwords and those requiring 
additional guidelines. Also similar to the first experiment, the qualitative data found that 
passwords with additional guidelines were significantly harder to generate and remember 
compared to passwords with only a length restriction. In addition, passwords in this 
experiment were also subjected to cracking software, the results finding that four of 
twenty-four minimal conditions passwords and three of twenty-four additional condition 
passwords could be cracked. The results concerning the breached passwords from both 
experiments suggested that the increase in the minimum length of minimal condition 
passwords from 5 to 8 characters that led to an increase in their recall time were as 
resistant to password cracking software as the minimum 8-character password 
incorporating additional guidelines. 
     To understand the effect of user-generated passwords versus randomly selected 
passwords on memorability, Yan, Blackwell, Anderson, & Grant (2004) compared the 
ease of memorizing two user-generated passwords constructed based on different 
composition guidelines and one randomly selected password. A total of 288 participants 
were divided into three groups. The participants in the first group created a password of a 
minimum of seven characters including at least one number. The participants in the 
second created a password by randomly selecting eight characters from a list of printed 
letters and numbers with their eyes closed. In the last group, the participants create a 
mnemonic-based password by choosing any character from each word of a phrase and 
representing it as a lower or upper case letter, a number or a special character. The 
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participants were asked to create and keep a written record of their passwords until they 
memorized them. After four months, the participants received a two-question email 
asking them to subjectively rate the ease of memorizing the passwords from 1 to 5, with 5 
being impossible, and to specify the duration participants referred to a written record until 
they memorized their passwords. The first group considered memorizing their passwords 
the easiest, rating it a 1.52, which was the lowest among the three groups. They also 
indicated that it took 0.7 weeks to memorize the passwords compared to 0.6 weeks for 
the mnemonics-based passwords and 4.8 weeks for the random passwords. These results 
suggest that random passwords are far less memorable than user-generated ones. 
However, the passwords of the three groups were of varying levels of strength due to 
their length and composition, thus affecting the generalizability of the results. In addition, 
keeping a written record of the passwords by the participants could also be considered a 
limitation of a study associated with a knowledge-based authentication system. 
     To investigate the effect of password construction guidelines on user behavior, Kuo et 
al. (2006) surveyed 290 participants. In the survey, a scheme of seven guidelines was 
given to all the participants, including recommendations to include numbers, lower and 
upper case letters, and special characters. The guidelines also recommended that 
passwords be long enough, not include dictionary words, not be related to the web site 
they were created for, and not be in a non-English language. The responses from the 
participants indicated that the number of guidelines they considered depended on whether 
they had received training on them earlier. There was a statistically significant difference 
between the number of guidelines considered by the participants who were aware of 
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password composition guidelines and the participants who were not. These results 
suggest that educating users on password composition guidelines affects user behavior, 
helping them to compose passwords that are both memorable and secure. 
     The increase in the variety and number of internet-based technologies and their 
password authentication systems has led to multiple password composition schemes. To 
study the issues of inconsistent password composition guidelines on an organizational 
level, Allendoerfer et al. (2006) interviewed 52 Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
employees, documenting their user experience with FAA password guidelines and 
systems. The employees experienced increased cognitive demands due to inconsistency 
in these guidelines, especially if they were similar but not exactly the same. Based on 
these results, Allendoerfer et al. (2006) recommended consistent password guidelines for 
all organizational password systems. 
     To address this issue, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
recommended the following user-generated password composition guidelines for all 
electronic authentication purposes (Burr, National Institute of Standards, & Technology, 
2006): 
1) A minimum of 8 characters selected from the keyboard of 94 printable characters 
2) At least one upper case letter, one lower case letter, one number and one special 
character 
3) No common words or permutations of usernames 
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     User-generated passwords created using these guidelines have an estimated guessing 
entropy of 30 bits, satisfying the Level 2 security recommended by NIST for password 
authentication. For system-generated random passwords composed from the 94 
characters on the keyboard, NIST estimates that five characters will satisfy its Level 2 
security recommendation (Burr, Dodson, & Polk, 2006). However, since these guidelines 
are only a recommendation, they are not widely implemented. 
     A more recent study investigating various user-generated password construction 
schemes was conducted by Vu et al. (2007). They investigated the number of attempts 
and the time required to generate passwords. They also evaluated the number of login 
errors and the time required to recall these passwords after a short and long duration of 
time. In the first of three experiments involving a total of 32 participants, 16 participants 
created passwords for three accounts and the remaining 16 created them for five. These 
user-generated passwords were restricted to at least six characters including an upper and 
a lower case letter, a digit and a special character. These passwords were also required to 
be unique for each of the three or five accounts and could not contain the participant’s 
username or any variations of it. The participants were asked to recall and login to their 
accounts four times in a random order 5 minutes after creation and after a week during a 
second recall session. The group with five accounts made significantly more recall errors 
than the group with three accounts. Most importantly, the experiment indicated that 
creating unique passwords for increasingly more accounts increased memory load. This 
conclusion was supported by the finding that 69 percent of the participants having five 
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accounts were unable recall their passwords after a week compared to 19 percent of the 
participants with only three accounts. 
     In the second experiment, also including two recall sessions, 20 participants created 
unique passwords for three accounts using the first letters of at least six words of a 
meaningful sentence constructed by them. The password for the remaining 20 
participants also used the first letters of at least six words of a meaningful self-
constructed sentence, but incorporated a digit and a special character. The results 
indicated that the difference in the password generation time between the two groups was 
statistically significant, with the first group taking 50.9 seconds and the latter 84.9 
seconds. The results also indicated that the login errors and login times for the second 
group were twice that for the first for both short-term and long-term recall. Sixty-two 
percent of the user-generated passwords containing only letters were breached by 
cracking software compared to 2 percent of the passwords including a digit and special 
character. These results indicated that including a number and a special character 
increased password security.  
     The first part of the third experiment compared generation times, login times, and 
login errors for passwords created based on four conditions. Of 60 participants, 30 
created passwords from the first letters of the words of a meaningful sentence they 
constructed including a digit and a special character, similar to the second condition of 
the previous experiment. The remaining participants created mnemonic-based passwords 
by replacing entire words of the sentences constructed with similar sounding words and 
 
 
13 
 
special characters as well as visually similar numbers and special characters. Fifteen of 
the first group of 30 participants created passwords in the first session and were then 
asked to enter them a week later in a second session. The remaining participants of the 
first group created a password, entered it after a short break of 5 minutes and were then 
asked to enter it again a week later in a second session. The second group of 30 
participants who created mnemonic-based passwords were similarly split into two sub-
groups, 15 involved in long-term recall and the remaining 15 subjected to both short-term 
and long-term recall. The results found that login times for passwords for long-term recall 
following short-term recall were 25 seconds faster than login times for only long-term 
recall for both first letter and mnemonic condition passwords. These results suggest that 
short-term recall improved the ability of the participants to remember their passwords.  
     In the second part of the third experiment, 15 new participants created passwords 
composed of the first letters of at least six words of a sentence constructed by them which 
also included a digit and a special character. These passwords were immediately entered 
with no short-term delay and then were recalled after a week. The results revealed that 
these participants took 45 seconds to login immediately and 47 after a week, significantly 
longer than mean login time of 21 seconds for the passwords created using the same 
guidelines in the first part that were recalled after a short-term and long-term period. 
These results suggested that the five-minute delay between password creation and short-
term recall helped participants to remember these passwords better. 
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     Although consistency of password composition schemes across systems can be 
achieved in organizations, it is difficult to implement such consistency across web sites. 
Florencio & Herley (2010) analyzed the password composition guidelines for 75 web 
sites with  medium to heavy internet traffic, including bank, government, university, 
brokerage and defense web sites, to name a few. The password composition guidelines of 
these web sites ranged from 1-character unrestricted passwords to 12-character passwords 
including all character sets. The researchers found no correlation between the strength of 
the passwords resulting from the password policies and the value of the assets, the 
number of users, the size of the web site and the number of attacks on the web site. Some 
of the commercial and social networking web sites that earned revenue with each login 
imposed fewer restrictions on password composition, accommodating passwords that 
were easy to create, recall and use for multiple login attempts. Complex password 
composition guidelines, if implemented on such web sites, might cause revenue losses 
due to a decrease in user traffic. This discussion suggests that password composition 
guidelines should create usable passwords compatible with the nature of a web site and 
its users.  
     Komanduri, Shay, Kelley, Mazurek, Bauer and Christin (2011) compared passwords 
created by 5,000 participants, each assigned to one of five conditions across two sessions. 
In the first condition, participants were asked to create at least eight-character passwords 
for the purpose of completing a survey, referred to collectively as the Basic8Survey, with 
no restrictions. In the second condition, participants created passwords for the purpose of 
creating an e-mail account, called the Basic8, based on the same guidelines. The third 
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condition, the Basic16, asked participants to create passwords of at least 16 characters 
with no restriction on the character sets used. The fourth, named Dictionary8, created 
passwords of at least 8 characters with no restrictions and with a dictionary check to 
prevent the use of commonly used strings. The fifth condition, the Comprehensive8, 
asked participants to create 8 character minimum passwords of at least a number, a 
special character and both cases of letters, with a dictionary check.   
      The participants were asked to enter their respective passwords twice, the second time 
to confirm the first entry. On successfully logging-in, the participants were asked to 
complete a survey asking for their demographics, their rating of the password creation 
process, and the strategies employed. The participants were again asked to re-enter their 
passwords with a maximum of five attempts permitted. After two days, in the second 
session the participants were asked to enter these passwords via an email with a 
maximum of five attempts permitted to recall their passwords. The participants also 
answered survey questions on password creation, storage and usage. The results from the 
first session found that among the participants with at least one password creation failure, 
Dictionary8 passwords were easier to create with fewer attempts required than the 
Comprehensive8 passwords, but took significantly more attempts to create than the 
Basic8, Basic8Survey and Basic16 passwords. Considering the cumulative password 
creation failed attempts, Comprehensive8 passwords resulted in the highest number of 
attempts with a mean of 3.35 followed by Dictionary8 passwords, the mean of which was 
significantly higher than for the Basic16 passwords. Basic8 passwords exhibited 
significantly fewer numbers of attempts at 1.13 compared to the other four conditions, 
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with the Basic8Survey mean being marginally higher at 1.17. Approximately 25 percent 
of the participants completely failed to create acceptable passwords in the 
Comprehensive8. However, the completion failure rates for the participants in the other 
conditions were significantly lower, all under 19 percent. The participants rated 
Comprehensive8 passwords as significantly more difficult to recollect followed by the 
Basic16 passwords.  
     In addition, the participants who did not externalize their passwords required an 
average of 1.22 attempts to recall their passwords, with the difference in number of recall 
attempts for each condition being significantly different from one another. Most of the 
participants in the Comprehensive8 condition agreed that the creation of these passwords 
was “annoying.” However, 67 participants in this condition believed that these passwords 
would make their main email accounts more secure, suggesting that the perceived 
strength of passwords may affect participant willingness to use those that are “annoying” 
to create. Other findings suggest that Basic16 passwords were as secure as 
Comprehensive8 passwords, but were relatively more usable. However, the study did not 
consider the factor of password creation times in either session.  
     Alternate authentication technologies like biometric and image-based password 
systems have been introduced to improve the memorability and reduce the cognitive 
demands of user-generated passwords. Image-based password systems depend on user 
recognition rather than recall. As a result, they are expected to be more memorable and 
less mentally demanding than traditional text-based passwords. Dhamija & Perrig, (2000) 
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compared image-based passwords to user-generated passwords with respect to task 
completion time and error rates. Twenty participants created passwords and immediately 
logged in and then re-logged in after a week. The user-generated passwords took less 
time to create and login than the image-based passwords. After a week, the login times 
for user-generated passwords were shorter than the login times for image-based 
passwords, even though the login error rate for user-generated passwords increased. One 
participant failed to login during the initial session using his/her user-generated password.      
There were no failed logins in the initial session for the image-based password. In the 
second session, user-generated passwords resulted in four more failed or unrecoverable 
logins than image-based passwords. Dhamija et al. (2000) did not analyze the data on 
task completion time and error rates for statistical significance. The results indicated that 
user-generated passwords had shorter task completion times but were not as memorable 
as the image-based passwords.   
     In a concurrent study, Brostoff et al. (2000) compared user-generated passwords to an 
image-based password system called Passfaces, recruiting 34 under-graduate students 
each of whom created both types of passwords. Logins, login failure rates, time before 
first use and the number of login attempts were recorded after the participants were asked 
to login again 3 months after creation. The results revealed that user-generated passwords 
had a higher login failure rate of 15.1% compared to 4.9% for Passfaces, a statistically 
significant difference. The time before first use of the user-generated passwords and 
Passfaces was also significantly different, the time taken for the former being less than 
for the latter. The number of login attempts for the user-generated passwords was found 
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to be three times higher than the number of login attempts for Passfaces, also statistically 
significant. These analyses show that participants using user-generated passwords took 
less time to learn the system but had higher login errors, similar to the previous study. 
The studies conducted by Dhamija et al. (2000) and Brostoff et al. (2000) found that the 
usability of image-based passwords was marginally better than that of user-generated 
passwords. User-generated passwords allow users to complete logins in a shorter amount 
of time and reduce learning time, but these advantages are offset by a higher number of 
login errors.  
      Previous research has compared the memorability and usability of system-generated 
passwords and user-generated passwords. Passwords created under various composition 
schemes have been compared in terms of login errors, task completion times, and recall 
rates after a short- or long-term period or both. However, there is limited research 
comparing user-generated passwords created under various conditions having 
approximately minimum equal entropy other than that of Komanduri et al. (2011). This 
study extended the research by Komanduri et al. (2011) by comparing the usability of 
assigned system-generated passwords with user-generated passwords created under two 
composition schemes, with all passwords satisfying the NIST Level 2 requirements of 30 
bits of entropy.  
3. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
      This study compared the usability of three types of text-based passwords of 
approximately equal minimum security: 
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1) An assigned 6-character system-generated password selected randomly from any 
of the 36 alphanumeric characters available on the standard QWERTY keyboard.  
2) A user-generated password of at least eight characters, with at least one lower 
case letter, one upper case letter, a number and one special character. This 
password must also pass a dictionary check. 
3) A user-generated password of at least 16 characters with no restrictions; this 
password must also pass a dictionary check.   
To compare the usability of the passwords created under these three conditions, the 
following hypotheses were proposed: 
Hypothesis 1:  The time taken to create a password account for the system-generated 
password will be less than that required for the 8-character user-generated or 16-character 
unrestricted user-generated password. 
This result is expected due to the shorter length of the system-generated password.  
Hypothesis 2a:  The number of attempts required to create a valid password in the first 
session will be lower for the 16-character unrestricted user-generated password than for 
the 8-character restricted user-generated password. 
These results are expected due to the lower complexity of the 16-character passwords 
than 8-character passwords. 
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Hypothesis 2b:  The number of unrecoverable passwords and Damerau-Levenshtein edit 
distance in the second session will be lower for the 16-character unrestricted passwords 
than for the other passwords. 
These results are expected due to the lower complexity of the 16-character unrestricted 
passwords than the 8-character restricted passwords and the 6-character alphanumeric 
system-generated passwords. 
Hypothesis 2c:  The Jaro-Winkler proximities in the second session will be higher for the 
16-character unrestricted password than for the other passwords. 
These results are expected due to the lower complexity of the 16-character unrestricted 
passwords than the 8-character restricted passwords and the 6-character alphanumeric 
system-generated passwords. 
Hypothesis 2d:  The NASA-TLX indices, time taken to recall and recall error rates will 
be lower for the 16-character unrestricted password than for either of the other passwords 
in both sessions.   
These results are expected due to the lower complexity of the 16-character unrestricted 
passwords than the other passwords. 
Hypothesis 2e:  The ease-of-use will be higher for the 16-character unrestricted password 
than for either of the other passwords in both sessions.   
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These results are expected due to the lower complexity of the 16-character unrestricted 
passwords than the other passwords. 
4. METHOD 
Participants 
     Fifty-four undergraduate, graduate students and staff members participated in this 
study. They were recruited through an email or a verbal invitation describing the 
experimental study. Students interested in participating were pre-screened via 
questionnaire to determine their eligibility. To be eligible, participants should have had 
prior experience using the Internet for a minimum of one year and in constructing 
passwords for user accounts on the Web. The 54 participants were randomly divided into 
three groups, 18 in Condition 1 who were assigned alphanumeric system-generated 
passwords of 6 characters, each randomly selected from any of the 36 alphanumeric 
characters available on the standard QWERTY keyboard; 18 in Condition 2 creating 
passwords of a minimum of 8 characters composed of at least one lower case and one 
upper case letter, a number and a special character, subject to a dictionary check; and 18 
participants in Condition 3 creating passwords with a minimum of 16 characters of any 
type characters, subject to a dictionary check. For Condition 1, prior to the experimental 
study, 40 Clemson University students were surveyed. This questionnaire asked 
respondents to rank three assigned alphanumeric system-generated passwords that varied 
in terms of character sets used and length but shared similar entropies (see Appendix G). 
They were asked to rank their most preferred form as one and their least preferred as 
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three. Statistical analysis of the responses indicated that 6-character alphanumeric 
system-generated passwords were preferred compared to 5 character completely random 
system-generated passwords and 7-character lower-case letter passwords. Based on these 
results, the 6-character alphanumeric password was selected as the system-generated 
password for the experimental study.  
Testing Environment 
     This study was conducted in the Human Computer Systems Laboratory in Freeman 
Hall. The experimental set-up consisted of a desktop computer, table, chair, paper and 
pencil. The participants were assigned a 6-character alphanumeric password or asked to 
create a password by entering it into a popup window generated by the application using 
the guidelines provided. Those participants who created passwords were also given 
instructions on memory aids such as mnemonics and passphrases. The computer 
presented a password login application into which all 54 participants in the experimental 
study entered their passwords during the first session. This application provided 
immediate feedback on whether the passwords created conformed to the stipulated 
password policies before storing them. The participants were then asked to take a five-
minute break, engaging themselves in a distraction task. The objective of the task was to 
reach the highest score in a game of Angry Birds (Rovio Entertainment Ltd., 2009). If the 
participants reached the highest score before five minutes, they were asked to continue to 
the next level of the game. At the end of the break, the participants were given five 
opportunities to enter their password. During the second session of the study, the 
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participants used the password login application to enter the passwords they were 
assigned or had created in the first session with a maximum of five attempts permitted. 
The researcher was present in the laboratory with the participants to provide guidance 
during both sessions.  
Experimental Design 
      This experiment is considered to be both a one-factor design with three levels and a 
two-factor design with two or three levels. The independent variable of the former 
investigates the password composition scheme at the three levels defined in Table 4.1 
below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
 
Table 4.1: Three levels of password composition 
Condition 1 Condition 2 Condition 3
1 
6 characters  
Alphanumeric 
characters selected 
from any of the 36 
characters 
available on the 
standard 
QWERTY 
keyboard 
System-generated 
and assigned 
No common words 
or repeated 
character 
sequences of 
length three or 
greater or 
permutations of 
usernames 
Minimum of 8 
characters 
Characters selected 
from any of the 94 
characters available 
on the standard 
QWERTY keyboard 
At least one lower 
and one upper case 
letter, one number 
and one special 
character 
No common words 
or repeated character 
sequences of length 
three or greater or 
permutations of 
usernames  
User-generated 
Minimum of 16 
characters 
Characters selected 
from any of the 94 
characters available 
on the standard 
QWERTY 
keyboard 
User-generated 
No common words 
or repeated 
character sequences 
of length three or 
greater or 
permutations of 
usernames  
 
1
(Burr et al., 2006) 
However, for dependent variables recorded two or three times over task sessions, the 
experiment was a two-factor design with two or three levels. The second independent 
variable of the study were the task sessions defined in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 below: 
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Table 4.2: 3x3 factorial design 
IVs Task Session 1:  
Creation 
Task Session 1:  
Recall 
Task Session 2:  
Recall 
Condition 1    
Condition 2    
Condition 3    
Table 4.3: 3x2 factorial design 
IVs Session 1: Recall Session 2: Recall 
Condition 1   
Condition 2   
Condition 3   
         All three password schemes resulted in passwords that possess a minimum guessing 
entropy of 30±2 bits (Burr et al., 2006). According to NIST guidelines (Burr et al., 2006), 
passwords of 16 characters or more do not need dictionary checks. However, we included 
a dictionary check for Condition 3 for consistency purposes. The dependent variables 
included objective and subjective measures of performance for each participant.   
     The objective measures for the first session consisted of the time taken to create an 
account and a password, the error rate during creation, the recall login error rates and the 
recall time. These error rates were calculated by dividing the total number of incorrect 
attempts by the total attempts made to complete the task.  Additionally, the Damerau-
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Levenshtein and Jaro-Winkler proximities of the incorrectly recalled passwords for each 
participant were recorded per recall session. The Damerau-Levenshtein distance between 
the recalled password and the stored password is the minimum number of operations, i.e. 
addition, subtraction, substitution or transposition, needed to transform the recalled 
password to the stored password. The Jaro-Winkler distance is a measure of similarity 
between the recalled password and the stored password. The objective measures in the 
second session included the recall login error rates, the recall time and the Damerau-
Levenshtein and Jaro-Winkler proximities of incorrectly recalled passwords for each 
participant.  
     Subjective data were obtained through the System Usability Scale (SUS) (see 
Appendix D) administered to the participants at the end of each session of the 
experimental study. The questionnaire at the end of the first session addressed the ease of 
creating the password and the ease-of-use and memorability of the passwords for this 
session; the questionnaire administered to the participants at the end of the second session 
addressed the memorability of the passwords created. In addition, at the end of each 
session, the NASA-TLX questionnaire (see Appendix E) was administered to the 
participants to measure mental, physical and temporal workload as well as the 
performance, effort and frustration component of the workload.  
     The data collected for each dependent measure were statistically analyzed using a one-
way analysis of variance or two-way mixed analysis of variance. The locus of any 
statistically significant difference was determined using an LSD post-hoc test.  
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Tasks 
     The experimental study was conducted in two sessions. In the first, the participants 
performed the following set of tasks: 
1) Condition 1 participants received a 6-character alphanumeric password generated 
by the application on a pop-up window. See Figure 4.1. 
2) Participants in Conditions 2 and 3 were provided a set of guidelines to create a 
password according to the password composition scheme assigned to them. See 
Figures 4.2 and 4.3. 
3) The usernames for the participants were automatically generated and pre-
populated in the popup window above the space for the password entry. 
4) These assigned or created passwords were entered into the same popup window in 
the space provided.   
5) After the entry of the passwords, all participants checked the feedback provided 
by the password login application.  
6) If the feedback indicated that the password did not conform to the one that was 
assigned or to its requirements, Step 4 was repeated. See Figures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. 
7) If the password entered was correct, the participants were asked to take a five-
minute break in which they played the computer game Angry Birds (Rovio 
Entertainment Ltd., 2009). 
8) After the break, the participants logged in using their assigned or created 
passwords. A total of five attempts were permitted for entering the password 
correctly for the first time. See Figures 4.7 and 4.8. 
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9) On entering the password successfully or exhausting all five recall attempts, the 
participants completed the System Usability Scale (SUS) and the NASA-TLX 
questionnaire 
     The participants were asked to return 5 to 7 days later, depending on their availability, 
to determine the memorability of their passwords by performing the following tasks: 
1) All participants entered the password they were assigned or that they created in 
the first session into the login application. 
2) A total of five attempts were permissible for entering the password correctly. 
3) On entering the password successfully for the first time, the participants 
completed the System Usability Scale (SUS) and the NASA-TLX questionnaire. 
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Figure 4.1: 6-character alphanumeric password creation 
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Figure 4.2: 8-character password creation 
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Figure 4.3: 16-character password creation 
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Figure 4.4: Response popup window for failed 6-character alphanumeric password 
creation 
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Figure 4.5: Response popup window for failed 8-character password creation  
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Figure 4.6: Response popup window for failed 16-character password creation  
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Figure 4.7: Password recall pop-up window 
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Figure 4.8: Failed password recall attempt 
Procedure 
     At the beginning of the first session, the researcher greeted the participants, who were 
then seated in front of a desktop computer on a table in the Human Computer Systems 
Laboratory. The researcher provided a brief overview of the experiment to the 
participants. After the participants read and signed the informed consent form (see 
Appendix A), they completed a pre-study questionnaire (see Appendix B) asking for 
demographics, information on their Internet experience and their previous experience in 
creating user accounts on the Internet. On completion of the pre-study questionnaire, the 
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researcher provided training on memory tools such as mnemonics and passphrases for 
Conditions 2 and 3, and the types of passwords that would not be accepted by a 
dictionary check for Conditions 2 and 3 (see Appendix C). These techniques could be 
used to assist in the creation and memorization of passwords. The duration of this 
training was approximately 5 minutes. The participants were then asked to memorize the 
passwords that they would be assigned or that they would create to avoid externalizing 
them. 
     After the completion of training, the participants were either assigned or they created 
passwords conforming to the password guidelines they were provided. They then 
subsequently entered them into the password login application on the desktop computer. 
The application provided immediate feedback as to correctness in the assigned password 
condition. In the user-generated password conditions, the application provided feedback 
as to whether the passwords created conformed to the required guidelines. Participants 
who failed were asked to re-create the passwords. The time taken and the number of 
errors committed during the creation of correct passwords in the first session were 
recorded. After a five-minute break, the participants entered the passwords assigned or 
created into the application, with five attempts allowed. The time taken to recall the 
password and the login error rates were recorded. On completion of this task, the 
participants were asked to complete the System Usability Scale (SUS) questionnaire (see 
Appendix D). These questions use a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (Strongly 
Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). Then, each participant was administered the NASA Task 
Load Index questionnaire to assess the performance, effort, frustration, mental, physical 
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and temporal demands experienced during the creation of the password (see Appendix 
E).  At the end of the session, the researcher asked the participant to schedule a date and 
time for the second session of the experimental study. The duration of the first phase of 
the study was approximately thirty minutes. 
     At the beginning of the second session, the researcher briefed the participants on the 
task to be completed. The researcher asked them to recall their passwords from the first 
session and to enter them into the password login application on the desktop computer. 
The time taken to recall the password was recorded. A maximum of five attempts was 
allowed for to the participants to recall their passwords correctly; if the participants failed 
to be able to do so in five attempts, the password was specified as unrecoverable. The 
Damerau-Levenshtein and Jaro-Winkler proximities for the unsuccessful attempts were 
recorded.  The participants were asked to complete the System Usability Scale 
questionnaire (see Appendix D). The researcher then administered the NASA Task Load 
Index questionnaire to the participants to assess the performance, effort, frustration, 
mental, physical and temporal demands experienced during the login task (see Appendix 
E). The duration of the second phase was approximately 20 minutes. See procedure flow 
for first and second session in Figure 4.9. 
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Figure 4.9: Procedure flow for first and second session 
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5. RESULTS 
 
     The data collected across all the task sessions for all the participants were screened 
and checked for the normality. These results showed that the times taken to create 
password accounts in the first session, the recall times in the first and second sessions, 
and the edit distances of Damerau-Levenshtein and Jaro-Winkler in the second session 
were non-normal with high skewness values. The data from these dependent variables 
were then transformed using the reciprocal function to normalize them.  
     The results were subsequently subjected to one-way or two-way mixed ANOVA, 
depending on whether the dependent variable was measured once or more than once the 
over task sessions. One-way ANOVA was applied to the three password policy 
conditions for the time taken to create passwords accounts (including memorizing and 
entering the password into the login application), the password creation error rates, and 
the Damerau-Levenshtein and Jaro-Winker edit distances. The Damerau-Levenshtein and 
Jaro-Winker edit distances for the first recall session were recorded for the fifty-six 
participants who successfully recalled their passwords within five attempts. 
Consequently, one-way ANOVA of the Damerau-Levenshtein and Jaro-Winker edit 
distances for the first recall session or a two-way mixed ANOVA could not be conducted 
due to the unequal sample size of participants in the first session.        
     Two-way mixed ANOVA was applied for the three password policy conditions across 
the two task sessions for the time taken to recall the passwords and for the recall error 
rates as well as for the subjective ratings from the NASA-TLX metrics and the System 
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Usability Scale (SUS) scores. The second independent variable, task session, involved 
two levels (the first session recall and the second session recall task) or three levels (the 
first session password creation task and the first and the second session recall tasks), 
depending on whether the measures of the dependent variables were repeated. More 
specifically, the time taken to recall the password and the recall error rates had two levels 
for each task session, i.e. recall task in first and second session. The subjective measures, 
NASA-TLX indices and the SUS scores had three levels for each task session, i.e. 
password creation task in first session and recall task in first and second
 
session.    
Objective Measures 
     The objective measures recorded for the first session were the time taken to create a 
password account and the error rates for password creation. For both sessions, the time 
taken to recall the password, the recall error rate and the edit distances were recorded. 
     Time taken to create a password account. The time taken to create a password 
account in the first session includes the time taken to receive an assigned password or to 
create a password, to memorize the assigned/created passwords and to enter the 
passwords into the application. These steps were measured from the time a password was 
assigned or requested to be created to the time the account was created. The descriptive 
statistics for this metric are provided in Table 5.1. Mean, standard deviation and error in 
the table are transposed (reciprocal) values of the original time recorded in seconds:  
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics for the transposed value of password account creation 
time  
Creation Time N Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
0.0278  
0.0191  
0.0131  
0.0200  
0.01612 
0.00979 
0.00634 
0.01280 
0.00380 
0.00231 
0.00150 
0.00174 
      
     A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to test the effect of the password 
policy conditions on the time taken to create a password account. The results indicated 
this effect was significant, F(2, 51)=7.395, p=0.002. Subsequent post-hoc analysis 
revealed that the time to create a password account was less for the system-generated 
passwords than for either the 8-character (p=0.028) or the 16-character passwords 
(p<0.001). There was no statistically significant difference between the 8-character and 
the 16-character password. The one-way ANOVA table for the transposed value of the 
time taken to create password accounts is provided in Table 5.2, and the original and 
reflected transposed values of creation time are plotted in Figures 5.1 and 5.2. These 
reflected transposed values were obtained by subtracting the transposed values from a 
constant so that bar graphs are in the same direction as the original values: 
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Table 5.2: One-way ANOVA data for the transposed value of account creation time 
Creation Time SS df Mean 
Squares 
F Sig. 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
.002 
.007 
.009 
2 
51 
53 
.001 
.000 
7.395 0.002 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Mean password account creation time (seconds) 
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Figure 5.2
2
: Reflected transposed values for password account creation time 
2
(The transposed values are reflected in this graph so that the higher values correspond to 
the longer creation time)     
     Password creation error rates. Password creation error rates, which measure the 
number of attempts taken to create an account conforming to the password policy 
condition, were measured by dividing the number of errors by the total number of 
attempts taken to create the password account. The descriptive statistics for this metric 
are provided in Table 5.3:  
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Table 5.3: Descriptive statistics for error rates during password account creation  
Error Rate N Mean  Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
0.0000 
0.2130 
0.1111 
0.1080 
0.000000 
0.278983 
0.213896 
0.217598 
0.0000 
0.06575 
0.05041 
0.02961 
 
     A one-way between subjects ANOVA was conducted to test the effect of the password 
policy condition on password creation error rates. The results indicated that this effect 
was significant, F(2, 51)=4.959, p=0.011. Subsequent post-hoc analysis revealed that the 
error rate for creating a password account was lower for the system-generated passwords 
than for the 8-character (p=0.003). However, there was no significant difference between 
the system-generated and 16-character passwords (p > 0.05) or the 8-character and 16-
character passwords (p > 0.05). The one-way ANOVA error rates are shown in Table 5.4, 
and the mean error rates are plotted in Figure 5.3. 
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Table 5.4: One-way ANOVA data for error rates 
Error Rate SS df Mean 
Squares 
F Sig. 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total 
.409 
2.101 
2.509 
2 
51 
53 
.204 
.041 
4.959 0.011 
 
Figure 5.3: Mean error rates during creation of password accounts 
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     Time taken to recall passwords. The time taken to recall the password, which 
includes the time taken to enter the passwords into the login application, was measured 
from the time the login application appeared to the time the participants completed the 
task. The descriptive statistics for this metric for both sessions are provided in Tables 5.5 
and 5.6. Mean, standard deviation and error in the table are the transposed (reciprocal) 
values of the original time recorded in seconds: 
Table 5.5: Descriptive statistics for the transposed value for the recall times for first 
session 
1
st
 Session 
Recall Times 
N Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
0.1542  
0.0802  
0.0627  
0.0990  
.05008 
.05369 
.03346 
.06074 
0.01181 
0.01266 
0.00789 
0.00827 
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Table 5.6: Descriptive statistics for the transposed value for the recall times for second 
session 
2
nd
 Session 
Recall Times 
N Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
0.0859  
0.0552 
0.0555  
0.0655  
.06584 
.03805 
.03549 
.04970 
0.01552 
0.00897 
0.00837 
0.00676 
 
     A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the main and interaction effects of 
the password policy conditions and the task sessions on the time taken to recall the 
passwords. The result indicated that the main effect was significant for both tasks, F(1, 
51)=15.634, p<0.001 and password creation condition F(2, 51)=15.170, p<0.001. 
Subsequent post-hoc analysis of the task session main effect revealed that the time taken 
to recall a password was less for the first session than for the second (p<0.001). Analysis 
of the password creation condition main effect revealed that the time taken to recall a 
password was less for the system-generated passwords than for either the 8-character 
(p<0.001) or the 16-character passwords (p<0.001). The difference between the 8-
character and 16-character password condition was not significant. The two-way mixed 
ANOVA data for the transposed value of the recall times are provided in Table 5.7: 
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Table 5.7: Two-way mixed ANOVA data for recall times 
Recall Times SS df Mean 
Squares 
F Sig. 
Task Sessions 
Conditions 
Task Sessions x Conditions 
Error (Within-subjects) 
Error (Between-subjects) 
.030 
0.078 
0.018 
.099 
.132 
1 
2 
2 
51 
51 
.030 
.039 
.009 
.002 
.003 
15.634 
15.170 
4.584 
0.000 
0.000 
0.015 
 
     The interaction effect of password policy conditions and task sessions on the time 
taken to recall passwords was significant, F(2, 51)=4.584, p=0.015. The interaction 
effects are plotted in Figure 5.4 and 5.5. Subsequent simple effects analysis of this 
interaction revealed that the time taken to recall a password in the
 
first recall session was 
less for the system-generated passwords than for both the 8-character passwords 
(p<0.001) and the 16-character passwords (p<0.001). The results showed no significant 
difference between the 8-character and 16-character password conditions (p >0.05). 
There was no statistical significance across password conditions in the second session. A 
repeated measure ANOVA was conducted for the simple effect analysis to test the effect 
of task session on the time taken to recall system-generated passwords, 8-character 
passwords and 16-character passwords. The results indicated the effect of the task session 
on the system-generated passwords was significant, F(1, 17)=17.527, (p=0.001). Post-hoc 
analysis revealed that the time taken to recall system-generated passwords for the
 
first 
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session was lower than for the
 
second session (p=0.001). The effects of task sessions on 
the time taken to recall 8-character and 16-character passwords were not significant. 
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Figure 5.4: Interaction effect plots of the time taken to recall password (seconds) 
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Figure 5.5
3
: Interaction effect plots of the reflected transformed values of time taken to 
recall 
3
(The transposed values are reflected in these graphs so that the higher values correspond 
to the longer recall time) 
     Recall error rates. The error rates, which specify the number of attempts taken to 
recall passwords in both sessions, were measured by dividing the number of errors by the 
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total number of attempts taken to recall the password. The descriptive statistics for this 
metric are provided in Tables 5.8 and 5.9: 
Table 5.8: Descriptive statistics for recall error rates for first session 
1
st
 Session 
Error Rates 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
0.000  
0.21761 
0.12967  
0.11567 
.00000 
.28748 
.25288 
.23486 
0.00000 
0.06776 
0.05960 
0.31961 
 
Table 5.9: Descriptive statistics for recall error rates for second session 
2
nd
 Session 
Error Rates 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std.  
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
0.2777 
0.30094 
0.20372  
0.26081 
.42779 
.41139 
.35956 
.39523 
0.10083 
0.09696 
0.08475 
0.05378 
 
     A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the main and interaction effects of 
the password policy conditions and the recall task sessions on recall error rates. The 
results of this analysis were significant for task sessions, F(1, 51)=5.274, p=0.026 but not 
significant for password policy conditions. Post-hoc analysis of the main effect of the 
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task session revealed that the recall error rate was lower for the first recall session than 
for the second (p=0.026). The interaction effect of password policy condition and recall 
task session on recall error rates was not significant (p>0.05). The two-way mixed 
ANOVA for error rates is provided in Table 5.10: 
Table 5.10: Two-way mixed ANOVA data for recall error rates 
Error Rates SS df Mean 
Squares 
F Sig. 
Task Sessions 
Conditions 
Task Sessions x Conditions 
Error (Within-subjects) 
Error (Between-subjects) 
.568 
0.286 
0.238 
5.493 
5.185 
1 
2 
2 
51 
51 
.568 
.143 
.119 
.108 
.102 
5.274 
1.407 
1.106 
0.026 
0.254 
0.339 
 
     The descriptive statistics for recall error rates in the first session show that there were 
no errors in recalling system-generated passwords. This suggests that there must be a 
significant difference across password policy conditions in the first session. A one-way 
between subjects ANOVA was conducted to test the effect of the password policy 
conditions on recall error rates in the first session. The results indicated this effect was 
significant, F(2, 51)=4.414, p=0.012. This result should, however, be interpreted 
cautiously because the variance of recall error rates for system-generated passwords in 
the first session was zero. Zero variability violates the assumptions of the analytical 
techniques employed. The interaction effects are plotted in Figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.6: Interaction effect plots for recall error rates 
 
     Unrecoverable passwords. Three system-generated, three 8-character and two 16-
character passwords could not be recalled in the first session. In the second session, four 
system-generated, three 8-character and two 16-character passwords could not be 
recalled.   
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 The Fisher Exact Probability test was conducted to explore possible significant 
difference in the number of unrecoverable password across password policy conditions in 
the second session. The analysis used a conservative p-value of 0.897, revealing no 
statistically significant difference.    
     Edit distances. The edit distances were recorded in both sessions of the recall tasks 
when participants failed to recall their passwords. However, since participants were 
required to recall their passwords in the first session, participants who failed to do so 
were replaced by new ones. Consequently, only edit distances for the second session 
were statistically analyzed. 
     Damerau-Levenshtein edit distances. The Damerau-Levenshtein distance between 
the recalled and the stored passwords is the minimum number of operations needed to 
transform recalled passwords into those stored. From the incorrectly recalled passwords 
in the second session, the four system-generated recorded values were 4, 6, 1 and 1; the 
three 8-character passwords recorded of values were 1, 5 and 3; and the two 16-character 
passwords recorded values were 3 and 2. The remaining passwords that were correctly 
recalled recorded a value of zero.  
     Data for this dependent variable were non-normal. After reciprocal transformation, the 
skewness value remained lower than -2 with a high kurtosis value. These data suggest 
that this dependent variable was zero inflated with eighty-three percent of the data being 
zero.    
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     Jaro-Winkler proximities.  The Jaro-Winkler distance is a measure of difference 
between the stored and the recalled passwords. From the incorrectly recalled passwords 
in the second session, the four system-generated recorded values were 0.000, 0.944, 
0.944 and 0.889; the three 8-character passwords recorded of values were 0.917, 0.778 
and 0.963; and two 16-character passwords recorded values were 0.946 and 0.931. The 
remaining passwords that were correctly recalled recorded a value of one.  
      Data for this dependent variable were also non-normal. After reciprocal 
transformation, the skewness value remained higher than +2 along with a high kurtosis 
value. These data suggest that this dependent variable was one inflated with eighty-three 
percent of the data being one. 
Subjective Measures 
     NASA Task Load Indices. The NASA-TLX assesses workload on six 7-point scales 
of mental, physical and temporal loads, performance, effort, and frustration with low and 
high end points. The NASA-TLX questionnaires were administered at the end of each 
task session, i.e., after first session--creation, first session--recall and
 
second session--
recall. The description of each subscale is provided in Table 5.11. 
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Title Endpoints Descriptions 
Mental Demand 
 
 
 
 
Physical Demand 
 
 
 
Temporal Demand 
 
 
 
 
Performance 
 
 
 
Effort 
 
 
Frustration 
Low/High 
 
 
 
 
Low/High 
 
 
 
Low/High 
 
 
 
 
Good/Poor 
 
 
 
Low/High 
 
 
Low/High 
How much mental and perceptual activity was 
required (e.g., thinking, deciding, calculating, 
remembering, looking, searching, etc.)? Was the 
task easy or demanding, simple or complex, 
exacting or forgiving? 
 
How much physical activity was required (e.g., 
pushing, pulling, turning, controlling, activating, 
etc.)? Was the task easy or demanding, slow or 
brisk, slack or strenuous, restful or laborious? 
 
How much time pressure did you feel due to the 
rate or pace at which the tasks or task elements 
occurred? Was the pace slow and leisurely or rapid 
and frantic? 
 
 
How successful do you think you were in 
accomplishing the goals of the task set by the 
experimenter (or yourself)? How satisfied were 
you with your performance in accomplishing these 
goals? 
 
How hard did you have to work (mentally and 
physically) to accomplish your level of 
performance? 
 
How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed and 
annoyed versus secure, gratified, content, relaxed 
and complacent did you feel during the task? 
 
Table 5.11: NASA-TLX rating scale definitions (Hart, 2006) 
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     Mental Demand. A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the main and 
interaction effects of the password policy conditions and task sessions on the mental 
demand experienced by participants while creating and recalling passwords. The results 
indicated that main effects were not significant, sphericity assumed, F(2, 102)=2.059, 
p>0.05 for task sessions and F(2, 51)=2.268, p>0.05 for password policy. The interaction 
effect was also not significant, sphericity assumed, F(4, 102)=1.155, p>0.05. The 
descriptive statistics and two-way mixed ANOVA data for mental demand are provided 
in Tables 5.12, 5.13, 5.14 and 5.15: 
Table 5.12: Descriptive statistics for mental demand during password creation 
1
st
 Session 
Password creation 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
3.00 
4.00 
3.89 
3.63 
1.372 
1.749 
1.779 
1.674 
0.323 
0.412 
0.419 
0.228 
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Table 5.13: Descriptive statistics for mental demand during recall in first session 
1
st
 Session 
Recall 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
2.56  
3.83 
2.72 
2.04 
1.464 
1.948 
2.109 
1.913 
0.345 
0.459 
0.497 
0.260 
 
Table 5.14: Descriptive statistics for mental demand during recall in second session 
2
nd
 Session 
Recall 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
3.33 
3.83 
2.89 
3.35 
2.000 
1.823 
2.220 
2.020 
0.471 
0.430 
0.523 
0.275 
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Table 5.15: Two-way mixed ANOVA data for mental demand 
Mental Demand SS df Mean 
Squares 
F Sig. 
Task Sessions 
Conditions 
Task Sessions x Conditions 
Error (Within-subject) 
Error (Between-subject) 
9.494 
25.568 
10.654 
235.185 
5.185 
2 
2 
4 
102 
51 
4.747 
12.784 
2.664 
2.306 
5.636 
2.059 
2.268 
1.155 
0.133 
0.114 
0.335 
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Figure 5.7: Mean rating for mental demand  
     Physical Demand. A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the main and 
interaction effects of the password policy conditions and task sessions on the physical 
demand experienced by participants while creating and recalling passwords. The results 
indicated the main effects were not significant, sphericity assumed, F(2, 102)=0.567, 
p>0.05 for task sessions and F(2, 51)=1.126, p>0.05 for password conditions. The 
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interaction effect was not significant, sphericity assumed, F(4, 102)=0.693, p>0.05. The 
descriptive statistics and two-way mixed ANOVA data for physical demand are provided 
in Tables 5.16, 5.17, 5.18 and 5.19: 
Table 5.16: Descriptive statistics for physical demand during password creation 
1
st
 Session 
Password creation 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
1.89 
2.06 
1.61  
1.85 
1.183 
1.162 
1.037 
1.123 
0.279 
0.274 
0.244 
0.153 
 
 Table 5.17: Descriptive statistics for physical demand during recall in first session  
1
st
 Session 
Recall 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
1.33  
2.06 
1.67 
1.69 
.767 
1.392 
1.138 
1.146 
0.181 
0.328 
0.268 
0.156 
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Table 5.18: Descriptive statistics for physical demand during recall in second session 
2
nd
 Session 
Recall 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
1.72 
2.00 
1.83 
1.85 
1.179 
1.237 
1.043 
1.139 
0.278 
0.291 
0.246 
0.155 
 
Table 5.19: Two-way mixed ANOVA table for physical demand 
Physical Demand SS df Mean 
Squares 
F Sig. 
Task Sessions 
Conditions 
Task Sessions x Conditions 
Error (Within-subjects) 
Error (Between-subjects) 
1.000 
4.778 
2.444 
89.889 
108.167 
2 
2 
4 
102 
51 
0.500 
2.389 
0.661 
0.881 
2.121 
0.567 
1.126 
0.693 
0.569 
0.332 
0.598 
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Figure 5.8: Mean rating for physical demand    
     Temporal Demand. A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the main and 
interaction effects of the password policy conditions and task sessions on the temporal 
demand experienced by participants while creating and recalling passwords. The results 
indicated that the main effect of task session approached significance, Wilks’ Lambda, 
F(2, 50)=2.723, p=0.075. The main effect for password policy was significant, F(2, 
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51)=4.860, p=0.012. Subsequent post-hoc analysis of the task session main effect 
revealed that the temporal demand was higher during the creation of the password 
account than for the recall of the same password in the same session (p=0.039). There 
was no significant difference between the recall of the password in the first and second 
sessions (p>0.05). Post-hoc analysis of the main effects of password policy revealed that 
the temporal demand was higher for the 8-character user-generated passwords than for 
system-generated passwords (p=0.003). The interaction effect was not significant, Wilks’ 
Lambda, F( 4, 100)=0.072, p>0.05. The descriptive statistics and two-way mixed 
ANOVA data for temporal demand are provided in Table 5.20, 5.21, 5.22 and 5.23. 
 
Table 5.20: Descriptive statistics for temporal demand during password creation 
1
st
 Session 
Password creation 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
2.17 
3.28 
2.67  
2.70 
1.249 
1.742 
1.715 
1.621 
0.294 
0.4113 
0.404 
0.221 
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Table 5.21: Descriptive statistics for temporal demand during recall in first session 
1
st
 Session 
Recall 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
1.83  
2.89 
2.11 
2.28 
1.425 
1.779 
1.278 
1.547 
0.336 
0.419 
0.301 
0.211 
 
Table 5.22: Descriptive statistics for temporal demand during recall in second session 
2
nd
 Session 
Recall 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
1.72 
2.72 
2.22 
2.22 
0.826 
1.674 
1.865 
1.550 
0.195 
0.394 
0.440 
0.211 
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Table 5.23: Two-way mixed ANOVA data for temporal demand 
Temporal Demand df F Sig. 
Task Sessions 
Conditions 
Task Sessions x Conditions 
Error (Within-subjects) 
Error (Between-subjects) 
Error (Task Sessions) 
2 
2 
4 
100 
51 
50 
2.723 
4.860 
0.072 
0.075 
0.012 
0.990 
Figure 5.9: Mean rating for temporal demand 
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     Performance.  A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the main and 
interaction effects of password policy and task session on the performance component of 
the NASA-TLX while creating and recalling passwords. The results indicated the main 
effect of the task session was significant, Wilks’ Lambda, F(2, 50)=7.058, p=0.002 and 
main effect of the password policy was not significant, F(2, 51)=2.405, p>0.05. 
Subsequent post-hoc analysis of the within-subject main effects revealed that the 
performance component was higher for the creation of the password account than for the 
recall of the same password in the same session (p=0.002) and higher for recall in the 
second session than for recall in the first session (p=0.019). The interaction effect was not 
significant, Wilks’ Lambda, F(4, 100)=0.582, p>0.05. The descriptive statistics and two-
way mixed ANOVA data for performance are provided in Tables 5.24, 5.25, 5.26 and 
5.27: 
Table 5.24: Descriptive statistics for performance during password creation 
1
st
 Session 
Password creation 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
2.28  
2.83 
2.11  
2.41 
1.406 
1.581 
1.605 
1.536 
0.331 
0.373 
0.378 
0.209 
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Table 5.25: Descriptive statistics for performance during recall in first session 
1
st
 Session 
Recall 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
1.50  
2.39 
1.56 
1.81 
1.339 
1.614 
1.294 
1.455 
0.316 
0.380 
0.305 
0.198 
 
Table 5.26: Descriptive statistics for performance during recall in second session 
2
nd
 Session 
Recall 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
2.72 
3.06 
1.78 
2.52 
2.469 
2.235 
1.734 
2.196 
0.582 
0.527 
0.409 
0.299 
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Table 5.27: Two-way mixed ANOVA data for performance 
Performance df F Sig. 
Task Sessions 
Conditions 
Task Sessions x Conditions 
Error (Within-subjects) 
Error (Between-subjects) 
Error (Task Sessions) 
2 
2 
4 
100 
51 
50 
7.058 
2.405 
0.582 
0.002 
0.100 
0.676 
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Figure 5.10: Mean rating for performance 
     Effort.  A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the main and interaction 
effects of the password policy conditions and task sessions on the effort required by the 
participants while creating and recalling passwords. The results indicated that the main 
effects were not significant, Wilks’ Lambda, F(2, 50)=1.661, p>0.05 for the task session 
and F(2, 51)=1.817, p>0.05 for the password policy. The interaction effect was also not 
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significant, Wilks’ Lambda, F(4, 100)=0.827, p>0.05. The descriptive statistics and two-
way mixed ANOVA data for effort are provided in Tables 5.28, 5.29, 5.30 and 5.31: 
Table 5.28: Descriptive statistics for effort during password creation 
1
st
 Session 
Password creation 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
2.83  
3.22 
3.17  
3.07 
1.425 
1.734 
1.505 
1.540 
0.336 
0.409 
0.355 
0.210 
 
Table 5.29: Descriptive statistics for effort during recall in first session 
1
st
 Session 
Recall 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
2.06  
3.33 
2.72 
2.70 
1.259 
1.879 
1.742 
1.700 
0.297 
0.443 
0.411 
0.231 
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Table 5.30: Descriptive statistics for effort during recall in second session 
1
st
 Session 
Recall 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
2.78 
3.50 
2.89 
3.06 
1.734 
1.757 
2.026 
1.837 
0.409 
0.414 
0.478 
0.250 
 
Table 5.31: Two-way mixed ANOVA data for effort 
Effort df F Sig. 
Task Sessions 
Conditions 
Task Sessions x Conditions 
Error (Within-subjects) 
Error (Between-subjects) 
Error (Task Sessions) 
2 
2 
4 
100 
51 
50 
1.661 
1.817 
0.827 
0.200 
0.173 
0.511 
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Figure 5.11: Mean rating for effort 
     Frustration. A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the main and 
interaction effects of the password policy conditions and task sessions on the frustration 
experienced by the participants while creating and recalling passwords. The results 
indicated that main effects were not significant, Wilks’ Lambda, F(2, 50)=0.235, p>0.05 
for the task session and F(2, 51)=2.037, p>0.05 for the password policy. The interaction 
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effect was also not significant, Wilks’ Lambda, F( 4, 100)=1.147, p>0.05. The descriptive 
statistics and two-way mixed ANOVA data for frustration are provided in Tables 5.32, 
5.33, 5.34 and 5.35: 
Table 5.32: Descriptive statistics for frustration during password creation 
1
st
 Session 
Password creation 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
2.17  
2.72 
2.39  
2.43 
1.425 
1.708 
1.819 
1.644 
0.336 
0.403 
0.429 
0.224 
 
Table 5.33: Descriptive statistics for frustration during recall in first session 
1
st
 Session 
Recall 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
1.61  
2.89 
2.50 
2.33 
1.092 
1.641 
1.543 
1.517 
0.257 
0.387 
0.364 
0.206 
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Table 5.34: Descriptive statistics for frustration during recall in second session 
2
nd
 Session 
Recall 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
2.06 
2.56 
2.06 
2.22 
1.798 
1.790 
1.474 
1.679 
0.424 
0.422 
0.347 
0.228 
 
Table 5.35: Two-way mixed ANOVA data for frustration 
Frustration df F Sig. 
Task Sessions 
Conditions 
Task Sessions x Conditions 
Error (Within-subjects) 
Error (Between-subjects) 
Error (Task Sessions) 
2 
2 
4 
100 
51 
50 
0.235 
2.037 
1.147 
0.791 
0.141 
0.339 
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Figure 5.12: Mean rating for frustration  
System Usability Scale (SUS) questionnaire. The System Usability Scale, a ten-item 
Likert-scale questionnaire that records global subjective assessment of the usability of a 
system, has a range of scores from 0-100. The SUS questionnaires were administered at 
the end of each task, i.e., 1
st
 session--creation, 1
st
 session--recall and 2
nd
 session--recall. 
Refer to tables 5.36, 5.37 and 5.38:  
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Table 5.36: Descriptive statistics of the SUS scores for password account creation 
1
st
 Session-Creation 
SUS score 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
63.4722  
68.0556 
66.1111  
65.8796 
19.65023 
16.19176 
17.55710 
17.61858 
 
Table 5.37: Descriptive statistics of the SUS scores for password recall in first session 
 2
nd
 Session-Recall 
SUS score 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
56.6667  
61.9444 
61.8056  
60.1389 
23.68606 
16.63968 
21.31358 
20.50895 
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Table 5.38: Descriptive statistics of the SUS scores for password recall in second session 
1
st
 Session 
Error Rates 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
System-generated 
8-character 
16-character 
Total 
18 
18 
18 
54 
56.5278  
62.0833 
66.5278  
61.7130 
19.38653 
18.03285 
21.43970 
19.73183 
 
      A two-way mixed ANOVA was conducted to test the main and interaction effects of 
the password policy conditions and the task sessions on system usability while creating 
and recalling passwords. The results indicated that the main effect of task session was 
significant, sphericity assumed, F(2, 102)= 3.766, p=0.026. The main effect of password 
policy was not significant, sphericity assumed, F(2, 51)=0.633, p>0.05. Post-hoc analysis 
of the task session main effect revealed that the SUS score was higher during the creation 
of the password account than during the recall of the same password in the same session 
(p=0.007). There were no significant differences between other task sessions. The 
interaction effect was not significant, sphericity assumed, F( 4, 102)=0.597, p>0.05. The 
two-way mixed ANOVA data for the SUS scores are provided in Table 5.39. 
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Table 5.39: Two-way mixed ANOVA data for SUS score 
SUS score SS df Mean 
Squares 
F Sig. 
Task Sessions 
Conditions 
Task Sessions x Conditions 
Error (Within-subjects) 
Error (Between-subjects) 
950.309 
1118.596 
301.312 
89.889 
45090.856 
2 
2 
4 
102 
51 
475.154 
559.298 
75.328 
126.169 
884.134 
3.766 
0.633 
0.597 
0.026 
0.535 
0.666 
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Figure 5.13: Mean SUS for creation task 
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Figure 5.14: Mean SUS for second session recall  
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Figure 5.15: Mean SUS for second session recall  
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6. DISCUSSION 
     Overall, the results from this study supported one hypothesis, that it would take less 
time to create an account with the system-generated password than with the other two 
password conditions; however, the remaining hypotheses were not supported.  
    Significant differences were found in error rates for the creation of passwords, the time 
taken to recall the password, error rates during recall and temporal demand across 
password conditions. Across task sessions, the time taken to recall system-generated 
passwords, the error rates during recall, the performance index of the NASA-TLX and 
the SUS scores were found to be significantly different. The overall relative performance 
among password policy conditions for dependent variables during each task sessions is 
provided in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3: 
Table 6.1: Relative performance of policy conditions during password account creation 
Dependent Variables System-
generated 
password 
8-
character 
password 
16-
character 
password 
Time take to create password account Low Medium High 
Password account creation error rates Low High Medium 
NASA TLX-Mental Demand: Password creation Low High Medium 
NASA TLX-Physical Demand: Password 
creation 
Medium High Low 
NASA TLX-Temporal Demand: Password 
creation 
Low High Medium 
NASA TLX-Performance: Password creation Medium Poor Good 
NASA TLX-Effort: Password creation Low High Medium 
NASA TLX-Frustration: Password creation Low High Medium 
SUS Score- Password creation Low High Medium 
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Table 6.2: Relative performance of policy conditions during first session recall 
Dependent Variables System-
generated 
password 
8-
character 
password 
16-
character 
password 
Time taken to recall passwords: First session Low Medium High 
Recall error rates in the first session Low High Medium 
NASA TLX-Mental Demand: First session recall Low High Medium 
NASA TLX-Physical Demand: First session 
recall 
Low High Medium 
NASA TLX-Temporal Demand: First session 
recall 
Low High Medium 
NASA TLX-Performance: First session recall Good Poor Medium 
NASA TLX-Effort: First session recall Low High Medium 
NASA TLX-Frustration: First session recall Low High Medium 
SUS Score- First session recall Low High Medium 
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Table 6.3: Relative performance of policy conditions during second session recall 
Dependent Variables System-
generated 
password 
8-
character 
password 
16-
character 
password 
Time taken to recall password: Second session Low High Medium 
Recall error rates in the second session Medium High Low 
Damerau-Levenshtein edit distances High Medium Low 
Jaro-Winkler proximities Low Medium High 
Unrecoverable password: Second session High Medium Low 
NASA TLX-Mental Demand: Second session 
recall 
Medium High Low 
NASA TLX-Physical Demand: Second session 
recall 
Low High Medium 
NASA TLX-Temporal Demand: Second 
session recall 
Low High Medium 
NASA TLX-Performance: Second session 
recall 
Medium Poor Good 
NASA TLX-Effort: Second session recall Low High Medium 
NASA TLX-Frustration: Second session recall Low High Low 
SUS Score- Second session recall Low Medium High 
 
Password Account Creation 
     It took significantly less time to create an account with the system-generated 
password, followed by the 8-character and the 16-chararacter passwords. The reason the 
latter two passwords took longer is likely because of the two stages required for account 
creation with user-generated passwords, i.e. the participants had to both create and 
memorize their passwords while complying with the restrictions presented. In contrast, 
the creation of the system-generated password account involved only memorization of an 
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assigned 6-character alphanumeric password. These findings are partially supported by 
the study conducted by Proctor et al. (2002), who found that the time taken to create 
passwords with only a minimum length restriction was less than for passwords of the 
same minimum length but with additional restrictions.   
     In addition, the participants who were assigned system-generated passwords 
committed no errors during the creation of their password accounts. While the 
participants who created 16-character passwords committed fewer errors than those 
creating 8-character passwords, this difference was not statistically significant. The 
participants required to generate their own passwords may have committed more errors 
because they failed to comprehend fully the restrictions imposed on their passwords 
during their first attempts to create one. Participants perhaps employed the creation 
password strategies they use in the wild; these may have conflicted with the restrictions 
imposed by this study. This explanation is further substantiated by the fact that 22 of the 
36 participants in the 8-character and 16-character conditions stated at the end of the first 
session that they habitually used a specific strategy to create user-generated passwords.  
     The observation that the participants creating 16-character passwords committed 
fewer errors than those creating 8-character passwords, though not statistically 
significant, is consistent with that of Komanduri et al. (2011). In the Komanduri et al. 
(2011) study, the participants creating 8-character restricted passwords had difficulty 
determining whether their password was a dictionary word without entering it. As a 
result, they took more than one attempt to create it. The 16-character passwords did not 
 
 
91 
 
have any such restrictions in the Komanduri et al. (2011) study, and the participants took 
fewer attempts to create them.     
     The effect of password policy on temporal demand was significant. Post-hoc analysis 
revealed that 8-character passwords incurred higher temporal demand than the system-
generated ones. This finding could be the result of the higher number of restrictions 
placed on the creation of 8-character passwords compared to the other two conditions. 
Participants creating these passwords may have felt under greater time pressure to 
complete the password creation task in a reasonable amount of time even though no time 
constraints were placed on them by the study.  
Recall Task in First Session  
     When the recall data were analyzed across both sessions, the main effects of password 
policy and task session as well as their interaction were found to be significant. The 
interaction effect was further analyzed using simple effects analysis, which revealed that 
the system-generated passwords took less time to recall than either the 8-character or 16-
character passwords in the 1
st
 session. One of the reasons for this result is that all of the 
participant assigned system-generated passwords recalled their passwords successfully on 
their first attempt. This was not the case for the participants using self-generated 
passwords. 
     The fact that users of the system-generated password committed no recall errors in the 
first session suggested a potentially significant difference compared to the other 
conditions. To explore this possibility further, a between-subject one-way ANOVA of the 
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effect of password policy conditions on error rates in the first session was conducted. 
This analysis revealed statistically significant differences across conditions. However, 
this result may be an artifact caused by the zero variance in the recall error rates for the 
system-generated password.  
Recall Task in Second Session  
     Four participants could not recall their system-generated passwords in the second 
session; three could not remember their 8-character passwords, and two could not 
remember their 16-character passwords. Although this trend supports the hypothesis that 
16-character passwords would have the fewest unrecoverable passwords, this difference 
is not statistically significant. This finding is partially consistent with the results found by 
Komanduri et al. (2011), who determined that there was no statistically significant 
difference in the number participants who failed to recall their user-generated passwords 
across password conditions.  
     One of the reasons for the lack of significance could be the better-than-expected recall 
of system-generated passwords. Informal discussion with several participants suggested 
that they found six-character alphanumeric passwords similar in nature to their previous 
or current passwords. A second reason for the lack of a significant difference in the 
number of unrecovered passwords could be the lower-than-expected performance in the 
recall of 16-character passwords. Although these passwords could be composed of only 
lower-case letters, seventeen of the eighteen participants in this password condition 
created passwords that included combinations of upper-case letters, lower-case letters, 
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numbers or special characters. Recalling 16-character passwords of such complexity 
could be a difficult cognitive task, a conclusion supported by a study conducted by 
Zviran et al. (1993) in which the user-generated passwords composed of only lower-case 
letters were recalled more frequently than the ones composed of more than one character 
set. Ten participants who belonged to the 16-character password condition commented 
that they felt that their passwords were more secure when they included characters other 
than lower-case letters. These participants were probably not aware that passwords 
composed of 16 lower-case letters are secure. Additionally, nine of these eighteen 
participants commented that they found the 16-character minimum length to be overly 
long.  
Difference Across Task Sessions  
     The simple effects analysis of the interaction effect for the time taken to recall also 
revealed that the system-generated passwords took less time to recall in the first session 
than in the second. A similar trend was observed for the 8-character user-generated 
passwords, but this difference was not significant. Additionally, there was also a 
significant difference between the error rates in the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 recall task sessions, 
presumably due to the degradation effect of time on memorability. 
     The Performance index of the NASA-TLX showed a significant effect for task 
sessions. This result suggests that the participants may have felt that it is significantly 
harder to create password accounts than recalling them after the distraction task in the 
first session. The participants may have felt that it was harder to create a password with 
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restrictions and then memorize the assigned or created password than to recall the 
passwords they created five minutes back, prior to the distraction task. The participants 
also indicated that they believed that their performance was significantly poorer during 
recall in the second session than in the first. This explanation is supported by the fact that 
the recall error rates for the first session were significantly lower than those for the 
second, possibly due to the degradation effect of time on memorability. 
     No statistical significance was found for ease-of-use across password policies. The 
descriptive statistics suggested that the usability of system-generated passwords was 
lower than that of the other password policies for account creation and for recall in the 1
st
 
and 2
nd
 sessions. All of the SUS scores were in the range of 56 to 68, below the 
acceptable SUS score of 70 (Bangor, Kortum & Miller, 2008), indicating all three 
password policy conditions are marginally usable. Thus, the task of developing a usable 
password policy that is also secure requires further study. However, the SUS scores were 
significantly higher during the creation of the password than for the recall task in the 
same session. This finding may be associated with the lower error rates in the creation of 
a password than for recalling them in the same session.  
Qualitative Analysis of Participant Comments  
     A total of fifty-three comments were recorded from sixty-two participants, including 
the eight participants who were replaced in the 1
st
 session. However, a majority of the 
comments came from the participants in the 8-character and 16-character password 
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conditions. These comments were grouped using an open card sort method. As a result of 
this sort, the seven categories seen in Table 6.4 emerged:  
Table 6.4: Categories of participant comments 
Categories Number of comments 
by participants 
Password strategy  22 
Secure password composition 10 
Password length 8 
Less secure password composition 5 
Password composition for memorability 4 
16-character password case-sensitivity 2 
Discomfort using 16-character password 2 
 
     The category “Password strategy” had the highest number of comments, twenty-two, 
indicating that participants used strategies to create passwords. One of the participants 
commented, saying “I try to remember how I created my passwords and not what I 
created.” This category was followed by “Secure password composition” with ten 
comments, emphasizing that passwords created by combining numbers, lower- or upper-
case letters or special characters were considered more secure. The participants in this 
category commented, saying “I prefer adding number and special characters to make my 
passwords more secure.” The participants were also of the opinion that 16-character 
passwords were too lengthy to create, a belief supported by eight comments under the 
category “Password length.” One of them commented on the password length of 16-
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character password, saying “This is too long!” indicating bias towards shorter password 
length, perhaps 8-character passwords. In addition, the five comments in the “Less secure 
password composition” category revealed that the participants thought that the 16-
character passwords composed of lower-case letters were less secure than the 8-character 
passwords. A participant commented on the 16-character password, saying “Although I 
knew I had an option of using only lower-case letters, I added number to make it more 
secure.” Four comments by participants suggested that including numbers with letters 
makes passwords easier to remember. One of the comments for this category was “I 
added numbers to my password to help make it more memorable.” Two comments 
suggested that the participants were unsure whether the 16-character password condition 
was case-sensitive or not. A participant was unsure of the case-sensitivity requirements 
and commented, “Do lower- and upper-case of the same letter count as two different 
characters?” Two other comments indicated the reluctance of the participants to use 16-
character passwords. One of the participants commented, saying “I am not used to 
creating a 16-character password.”  
     This analysis perhaps indicated a bias of the participants towards the Clemson 
University password policies, which requires a password to have at least one number, a 
letter and a special character. These passwords must be at least 8-characters long with no 
spaces and no more than two repeated characters. This bias would explain the large 
number of comments, twenty-three, indicating the use of a strategy to create passwords.  
 
 
97 
 
      Pareto analysis of the frequencies of these seven categories seen in Figure 6.1 
revealed that the three most frequently occurring comment categories of comments were 
password strategy, secure password composition and password length.  
  
Figure 6.1: Pareto chart analysis 
These three categories represented 80 percent of the total number of comments.  
Analysis of User-Generated Passwords 
      An additional analysis of the user-generated passwords was conducted. The average 
length of the minimum 8-character passwords in this study was 12.05 characters. All of 
these passwords included lower-case letters, upper-case letters, number and special 
characters. The average length of the minimum 16-character passwords was 17.61 
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characters, with the average number of character sets included being 2.83. This extensive 
use of multiple character sets again suggests that the participants either did not 
comprehend the 16-character restrictions well or preferred adding more character sets 
rather than relying only on lower-case letters alone. Seventeen of the eighteen minimum 
16-character passwords were composed of more than lower-case letters. Tables 6.5 and 
6.6 list the passwords created by the participants:  
Table 6.5: 8-character passwords 
Hitman#21 Fr3nchfr!es Zzyellow#9 
aceg1#5I Harry_Grewal1986 Ummagumma90() 
BeingHappyIsEasy123!@# 24Te&01di Rempasishar1@ 
Ragam_endral_sahana1 Q!w2e3r4 IA@csmman123 
N1keSh*x Demonicsages@786 Zandubam@30 
FluorDaniel123# ZaMBI@316 iMd0ne++ 
 
Table 6.6: 16-character passwords 
f@llSemester201! Mechanical_2010@clemson !@#caretAker123!@# 
pocpoc1poc2poc3poc4 m@thewph1l1p@ng@y1l ThISvLoNGpWORD16 
samurai_09031987 qwertyuilkjhgfds clemsonpssjul11* 
shanpa0320210917 clemson2011mechanical IwillmissClemson 
H12A34S56H78I90M cuid@iefreeman103 Rgalgalclemson77&& 
lijjo@fman0801sirvey abcdefgh12345678 Aniruddha_1985_5nov 
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     The 8-charcater and the 16-charcter password had an average of 2.11 and 3 chunks of 
information i.e. words/numbers/letters/special characters respectively. The participants 
appeared to use password creation based on their previous or current environment, 
condition and actions. For example, the password “f@llSemester201!” is based on the 
academic calendar and the “lijjo@fman0801sirvey” is based on the first and last name of 
participant, the location, the date of the study and the nature of the study, exhibiting the 
tendency of the users to create passwords reflecting the current period, environment or 
action. Passwords like “ThISvLoNGpWORD16”, “Mechanical_2010@clemson” and 
“IwillmissClemson” support the comments that participants use a strategy for creating 
passwords, either ones they learned in the past or the ones taught to them during the 
creation session. Other passwords like “qwertyuilkjhgfds” were composed of sequences 
of characters based on their placement on the keyboard. Except for the password 
“qwertyuilkjhgfds,” the 16-character passwords in Table 6.6 mirrored the comments of 
the participants in relation to including character sets other than lower-case letters. 
7. CONCLUSION  
     This study compared the usability of three password conditions that assigned or 
helped users to generate passwords of approximately equal minimum security, evaluating 
the trade-off between the length and the complexity of the passwords. The most 
important conclusion of this study is that the performance of the 8-character password 
was weaker than that of the system-generated password during the creation of password 
accounts and was weaker than the 16-character password in the terms of long-term recall. 
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Compliance with the restrictions associated with 8-character passwords strengthen 
security, but creates a password that is complex in composition. Thus, with the increase 
in applications requiring 8-character password accounts, a user may experience cognitive 
load when recalling a password from among competing passwords of similar 
composition. However, if a 16-character password is created from a meaningful 
combination composed of preferably lower-case letters, it may be more memorable than 
8-character passwords subject to multiple restrictions.   
     Currently, the designers of password applications put most of the responsibility for 
creating a secure password on the users, forcing them to comply with a variety of 
restrictions. The complexity of such passwords may increase their security, but such 
security can also be achieved by increasing the minimum length of the password and 
lowering the complexity of these passwords, reducing the cognitive load on users. Thus, 
efforts should be taken to educate users on the trade-off between the length and the 
complexity of user-generated password. A simpler and longer password can be as secure 
as a shorter but more complex one.  
     Designers should consider developing applications that aid users in creating longer but 
more meaningful passwords to reduce the cognitive load for the users. These applications 
could implement methods to produce 16-character passwords with meaningful 
combinations of letters, making the password more memorable to the user. However, care 
should be taken by the designers to avoid explicitly restricting users to lower-case letters 
only.  
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      This study is a first step in exploring usable password conditions of approximately 
equal security. Below are suggestions for future research: 
 Studies involving participants belonging to a wider range of demographics. 
 Studies in the wild (real setting outside the laboratory) involving more 
participants. 
 Studies on the effect of educating participants on the security of longer passwords 
composed of lower-case letters. 
 Studies involving a longer time period between creation and recall tasks to 
validate the results of the long-term recall of passwords across conditions. 
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A 
Consent form for study participants 
Information Concerning Participation in a Research Study 
Clemson University 
 
 Evaluating the usability of system-generated and user-generated passwords of 
approximately equal security  
 
Description of the Research and Your Participation 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Sourav Bhuyan under the 
direction of Dr. Joel Greenstein. The purpose of this research is to evaluate the usability 
of passwords, either assigned or created, having approximately 30 bits of entropy (a 
measure of the security of the password).  
 
This study will take place over two sessions. Your participation in the first session will 
involve being introduced to the research, signing an informed consent form, completing a 
pre-test questionnaire, completing tasks according to the instructions from the researcher 
and completing post-test questionnaires. You will be asked to return after 5 to 7 days to 
complete a second set of tasks and answer post-test questionnaires. These post-test 
questionnaires consist of standardized satisfaction and workload surveys. 
 
The amount of time required for your participation will be approximately thirty minutes 
for Session One and twenty minutes for Session Two. 
 
Risks and Discomforts 
 
There are no known risks associated with this research. 
 
Potential Benefits 
 
This research may help us to discover more usable and secure methods for generating 
passwords. 
 
 
Protection of Confidentiality 
 
We will do everything we can to protect your privacy. Collected data will be stored 
securely in 147 Freeman Hall and access will be limited to the investigators. Your 
identity will not be revealed in any publication that might result from this study. 
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In rare cases, a research study will be evaluated by an oversight agency, such as the 
Clemson University Institutional Review Board or the Federal Office for Human 
Research Protections, which would require that we share the information we collect from 
you. If this happens, the information will only be used to determine if we conducted this 
study properly and adequately protected your rights as a participant. 
 
Voluntary Participation 
 
Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate 
and you may withdraw your consent at any time. You will not be penalized in any way 
should you decide not to participate or to withdraw from this study. 
 
You may choose to stop taking part in this study after today. If you do, we will remove 
your information from the study. However, if we have already completed our research 
analysis, we will not be able to remove your information from the study. 
 
Contact Information 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this study or any problems arise, please 
contact Dr. Joel Greenstein at Clemson University at 864-656-5649. If you have any 
questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please contact the 
Clemson University Office of Research Compliance (ORC) at 864-656-6460 or 
irb@clemson.edu. If you are outside the Upstate South Carolina area, please use the 
ORC’s toll-free number, 866-297-3071. 
 
Consent 
 
I have read this consent form and have been given the opportunity to ask questions. 
I give my consent to participate in this study. 
 
Participant’s signature: ____________________________________ Date: 
_________________ 
 
 
A copy of this consent form will be given to you. 
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Appendix B 
 
PRE-TEST QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
GENERAL 
 
Participant: ______________________ (This will be filled out by the test administrator.) 
 
Age:  ______________________ 
 
Gender:       Male      Female 
 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 
1. Please select your academic level: 
 
Undergraduate student 
Graduate student  
Other 
 (Please specify: ____________________________________________) 
 
 
2. List your major area of study: ____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
COMPUTER EXPERIENCE 
 
3. How long have you been using computers? 
 
< 1 year          1-2 years               3-5 years > 5 years (Please specify) ________ 
 
 
4. How long have you used passwords? 
 
< 1 year         1-2 years               3-5 years  > 5 years (Please specify) ________ 
 
 
 
5. How many unique passwords do you have? 
 
1            2            3            More than 3 (Please specify the number) ________ 
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Appendix C 
Methodologies for remembering passwords*  
*Source: Guide to Enterprise Password Management (Draft), NIST Special Publication 800-118 (Draft) 
1. Mnemonic Method: A user selects a phrase and extracts a letter from each word 
(e.g., the first or second letter of each word), adding numbers or special characters 
or both. 
Example: 
Phrase Password 
Please be my best valentine! 
 
This is the worst car I have ever driven in my LIFE! 
 
I am definitely your #1 fan. 
 
Pbmbval! 
 
TitwcIhedimLIFE! 
 
Iady#1f. 
 
2. Altered Passphrases: A user selects a phrase and alters it to form a derivation of 
that phrase. 
 
Example: 
Passphrases Alternate Passphrases 
to be or not to be  
 
Dressed to the nines 
 
2.be.0r.n0t@to0.bEE 
 
Dressed*2*the*9z 
 
 
3. Combining and Altering: A user can combine two or three unrelated words and 
change  
various letters to numbers or special characters. 
 
Example: 
Words Password 
“bank” and “camera” 
 
“mail” and “phone” 
 
B@nkC@mera 
 
m4!lf0N3 
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Appendix D 
System Usability Scale Questionnaire 
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Appendix E 
NASA-TLX questionnaire 
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Appendix F 
 
Consent form for pilot study participants 
 
Information Concerning Participation in a Research Study 
Clemson University 
 
Evaluating the usability of system-generated and user-generated passwords of 
approximately equal security 
 
Description of the Research and Your Participation 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Sourav Bhuyan under the 
direction of Dr. Joel Greenstein. The purpose of this study is to record your preference 
for different passwords that are system-generated and assigned, having approximately 30 
bits of entropy (a measure of security of the password).  
 
Your participation will involve being introduced to the study, signing an informed 
consent form, completing demographic questions, and ranking the three passwords in 
terms of your preference.  
 
The amount of time required for your participation will be approximately 15 minutes. 
 
Risks and Discomforts 
 
There are no known risks associated with this research. 
 
Potential Benefits 
 
This research may help us to discover more usable and secure methods of generating 
passwords. 
 
 
Protection of Confidentiality 
 
We will do everything we can to protect your privacy. Collected data will be stored 
securely in 147 Freeman Hall and access will be limited to the investigators. Your 
identity will not be revealed in any publication that might result from this study. 
 
In rare cases, a research study will be evaluated by an oversight agency, such as the 
Clemson University Institutional Review Board or the Federal Office for Human 
Research Protections, which would require that we share the information we collect from 
you. If this happens, the information will only be used to determine if we conducted this 
study properly and adequately protected your rights as a participant. 
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Voluntary Participation 
 
Your participation in this research study is voluntary. You may choose not to participate 
and you may withdraw your consent at any time. You will not be penalized in any way 
should you decide not to participate or to withdraw from this study. 
 
 
You may choose to stop taking part in this study after today. If you do, we will remove 
your information from the study. However, if we have already completed our research 
analysis, we will not be able to remove your information from the study. 
 
Contact Information 
 
If you have any questions or concerns about this study or any problems arise, please 
contact Dr. Joel Greenstein at Clemson University at 864-656-5649. If you have any 
questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, please contact the 
Clemson University Office of Research Compliance (ORC) at 864-656-6460 or 
irb@clemson.edu. If you are outside the Upstate South Carolina area, please use the 
ORC’s toll-free number, 866-297-3071. 
 
Consent 
 
I have read this consent form and have been given the opportunity to ask questions. 
I give my consent to participate in this study. 
 
Participant’s signature: ____________________________________ Date: 
_________________ 
 
 
A copy of this consent form will be given to you. 
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Appendix G 
PREFERENCE RANKING QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
GENERAL 
 
Participant: ______________________ (This will be filled out by the test administrator.) 
 
Age:  ______________________ 
 
Gender:       Male      Female 
 
 
 
EDUCATION 
 
1. Please select your academic level: 
 
Undergraduate student 
Graduate student (Master’s or Ph.D.) 
Other 
 (Please specify: ____________________________________________) 
 
 
2. List your major area of study: ____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
RANK THE PASSWORDS  
 
Rank the passwords that you prefer the most to be assigned to you as #1 and least preferred as #3 
 
1. Password - kholscx 
 
      Rank # ________ 
 
 
2. Password - djh45j 
 
      Rank # ________ 
 
 
 
3. Password - V#l9N 
 
      Rank # ________ 
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